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GENERAL TELEPHONE 
COMPANY OF THE SOUTHWEST 
v. FALCON: RULE· 23's 
APPLICATION TO TITLE VII 
I. INTRODUCTION 
A minority person comes into your office and complains of 
his employer discriminating against him on the basis of his race 
or national origin. He alleges, specifically, that he was denied a 
promotion which was granted to several white employees with 
lower evaluation scores, seniority, and qualifications. 
You accept him as a client and file a complaint with the 
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). The 
complaint alleges that the employer maintained a policy, pattern 
and practice of employment which discriminated against both 
your client and minorities as a class. You receive a right to sue 
letter from the EEOC and bring a Title VII class action in the 
federal district court.1 At this juncture you will have to address 
the issues of the scope and breadth of the prospective class, and, 
more particularly, whether or not it will be possible to represent 
1. A Title VII suit may not be brought in the district courts without first filing a 
charge with the EEOC and receiving a right to sue letter therefrom. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
5(b) (1976) (NeceBBity and timelineBB of filing a charge with the EEOC); 42 U.S.C. I 
2000e-5(k)(1) (1976) (Right to sue letter); 42 U.S.C. §22000e-5(f) (1976) (Enabling legis-
lation giving the federal district courts sole authority to hear Title VII suits). See note 6, 
infra. 
Caveat: 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(c) (1976) provides that when there is a qualified state 
employment agency, a complaint must be filed there. The statute also provides that the 
limitations period for filing with the EEOC is extended from 180 days to 300 days when 
the aggrieved party has initiated a complaint with such agency. 1d. Section 2000e-5(c) 
further provides that no charge may be filed with the EEOC until the expiration of 60 
days after proceedings have been commenced with the state agency. If such state is a 
deferral state, where the EEOC will defer any charge filed with it to the state agency, 
then there is a trap for the unwary. In Mohasco Corp. v. Silver, 447 U.S. 807 (1980), the 
Supreme Court held that the effect of this deferral provision is to render untimely any 
charge originally filed with the EEOC more than 240 days after the act complained of, 
unleBB the state agency disposes of the charge before a total of 300 days has elapsed. 1d. 
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a class of both employees who were denied promotion as well as 
applicants who were denied employment. 
It was this latter aspect of class certification, whether or not 
it is possible to allow an employee to represent a class of both 
employees and applicants, which was before the United States 
Supreme Court in General Telephone Company of the South-
west v. Falcon, but the Court in effect left that issue unan-
swered.1 This case note will summarize and discuss the outcome 
and background of that case, along with the application of Rule 
231 to Title VII actions. 
Currently, under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 
courts are not required to include findings of fact and conclu-
sions of law in orders granting or denying class certification! Be-
2. 102 S. Ct. 2364 (1982) (Justice Stevens delivered the opinion of the court. Chief 
Justice Burger concurred in part, and dissented in part.) The facts in the introduction to 
this note are essentially those found in Falcon. 
3. Rule 23 provides in pertinent part: 
(a) Prerequisites to a cl88s action. One or more members 
of a clasa may sue or be sued 88 representative parties on be-
half of all only if (1) the class is so numerous that joinder of 
all members is impracticable, (2) there are questions of law or 
fact common to the clasa, (3) the claims or defenses of the rep-
resentative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the 
clasa, and, (4) the representative parties will fairly and ade-
quately protect the interests of the c!asa. 
Furthermore, the rule requires that the suit satisfy one of Rule 23(b)'s three subdivi-
sions, but this only becomes relevant after Rule 23(a)'s requirements are met. See, P.,., 
Ladele v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 95 F.R.D. 198, 202 (E.D. Penn. 1982). 
Rule 23(b) provides in pertinent part: 
(b) Clasa Actions Maintainable. An action may be main-
tained 88 a clasa action if the prerequisites of subdivision (a) 
are satisfied, and in addition: • • . (2) the party opposing the 
clasa has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applica-
ble to the clasa, thereby making appropriate final injunctive 
relief or corresponding declaratory relief with respect to the 
clasa 88 a whole . . • . 
Employment discrimination suits are regarded 88 Rule 23(b)(2) suits. See Wetzel v. 
Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 508 F.2d 239, 250 (3d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1011. 
See also Fed. R. Civ. P. advisory committee note to the 1966 Rule 23 revisions, 39 F.R.D. 
69, 102 (1966). 
4. Fed. R. Civ. P. 52 provides that "Findings of fact and conclusions of law are 
unneceaaary on decision of motions under Rules 12 or 56 or any other motion .... " 
(emphasis added). See also Fed. R. Civ. P. 52 notes of advisory committee on 1946 
amendments. ("The last sentence of rule 52 (a) 88 amended will remove any doubt that 
findings and conclusions are unneceasary upon decisions of a motion . . . except 88 pro-
vided in amended Rule 41(b).") 
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cause of the complex nature of the law and facts involved in 
class suits, this note will also suggest a requirement, possibly 
through amendment of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 
that such orders make explicit, through written findings and 
conclusions, the factors taken into account in the court's deci-
sion. Such a requirement would aid the courts in properly apply-
ing Rule 23 to Title VII. Moreover, written findings of fact and 
conclusions of law would also provide the parties, especially the 
losing party, with an articulated basis for the court's decision. 
II. RULE 23 AND TITLE VII 
Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides 
that a class action may be maintained by a party to a lawsuit 
when: (1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is 
impracticable; (2) there are questions of law or fact common to 
the class; (3) the claims or defenses of the class are typical of the 
claims or defenses of the class representative; and (4) the repre-
sentative party will fairly and adequately protect the interests of 
the class.& 
Title VII was passed in order to abrogate the adverse conse-
quences of employment discrimination}' Rule 23, therefore, has 
5. See note 3, supra. 
6. "The primary purpose of Title VII was to 'assure equality of employment oppor-
tunities and to eliminate those discriminatory practices and devices which have fostered 
racially stratified job environments to the disadvantage of minority citizens.' " Teamsters 
v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 348 (1976). See also S. REP. No. 872, 88th Cong., 2d Sess., 
reprinted in 1964 U.S. CODB CONGo & AD. NBws 2355, 2515: 
The failure of our society to extend job opportunities to the 
Negro is an economic waste. The purchasing power of the 
country is not being fully developed. This, in turn, acts as a 
brake upon potential increases in gross national product. In 
addition, the country is burdened with added costs for the 
payment of unemployment compensation, relief, disease, and 
crime. 
National prosperity will be increased through the proper 
training of Negroes for more skilled employment together with 
the removal of barriers for obtaining such employment. 
Through toleration of discriminatory practices, American in· 
dustry is not obtaining the quantity of skilled workers it needs 
A nation need not and should not be converted into a wel-
fare state to reduce poverty, lessen crime, cut down unemploy-
ment, or overcome shortages in skilled occupational categories. 
All that is needed is the institution of proper training pro-
grams and the elimination of discrimination in employment 
3
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generally been liberally applied to Title VII actions because dis-
crimination based on factors such as race, sex, or national origin 
is, by definition, class discrimination.7 The problem, however, is 
properly defining the scope and breadth of the class so that it 
falls both within the confines of Rule 23's four requirements and 
still furthers the policies and objectives of Title VII. s 
III. THE "ACROSS THE BOARD" APPROACH 
The Fifth Circuit adopted an "across the board" approach 
to Title VII class action suits by allowing an employee, aggrieved 
by a single employment practice, to attack many of the em-
practices .... 
In response to this need, the Judiciary Committee incor-
porated Title VII into H.R. 7152. 
See a130 County of Washington v. Gunther, 101 S. Ct. 2242, 2252 (1981), citing S. REP. 
No. 867, 33d Cong., 2d Se88. 12 (1964); McDonnell Douglass Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 
792, 800-01 (1973); Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 209 (1972); 
Griggs v. Power Duke Co., 401 U.S. 424, 426-30 (1971) ("Congre88 provided for Title VII 
... for class actions for the provision8 of [Title VII and) the objective of Congres8 in the 
enactment of Title VII ... was to achieve equality of employment opportunities and 
remove barriers that have operated in the past to favor an identifiable group of white 
employees over other employees. ") 
7. In Bowe v. Colgate Palmolive Co., 416 F.2d 711, 719 (7th Cir. 1969), in an oft 
quoted passage, the court stated that a Title VII 8uit is necessarily a class action "as the 
evil sought to be ended i8 discrimination on the basis of a class characteristic, i.e., race, 
sex, religion or national origin." See Jenkins v. United Gas Corp., 400 F.2d 28, 33 (5th 
Cir. 1968) ("Whether in name or not, [a Title VII) suit is perforce a 80rt of class action 
for fellow employees 8imilarly situated.") See a130 United States v. McDonald, 432 U.S. 
385, 393, n.13 (1977); Albermarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 414 n.8 (1974). 
8. Vuyanich v. Republic National Bank, 82 F.R.D. 420 (N.D. Tex. 1979) ("Indeed, 
the body of Rule 23 law is virtually incomprehensible unle88 cases are viewed as fashion-
ing distinct approaches for distinct substantive areas .... Therefore, this court ought 
to apply the standards of Rule 23 to the purported class and its representatives with its 
gaze leveled at Congre88' intent in enacting Title VII.") 
The desirability of bringing Title VII suits via class action is enhanced by its inher-
ent economy of litigation. Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682, (1979) ("Class action de-
vice saves the resources of both courts and the parties by permitting an i8Bue potentially 
affecting every party to be litigated in an economical fashion under Rule 23." rd. at 701.) 
(No abuse of discretion in certifying a nationwide class.) See a130 Coopers & Lybrand v. 
Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 469 (1977); American Pipe & Construction Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 
538, 553 (1973). "[Rule 23) encompasses those cases in which a class action would 
achieve economies of time, effort, and expense, and promote uniformity of decision as to 
persons similarly 8ituated, without sacrificing procedural fairne8B of bringing about other 
undesirable results." Advisory Committee Notes to 1966 Amendments to Rule 23, 39 
F.R.D. 69, 102-03 (1966). The rule in fact codifies the older equitable procedure whereby 
a single representative could represent an entire class. See Supreme Tribe of Ben Hur v. 
Cauble, 255 U.S. 356, 363 (1920) ("For convenience, therefore, and to prevent a failure of 
justice, a court of equity permits a portion of the parties in interest to represent the 
entire body .... "); Smith et. aI. v. Swormstedt et. aI., 57 U.S. (16 How.) 288 (1853). 
4
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 13, Iss. 2 [1983], Art. 7
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol13/iss2/7
1983] GENERAL TELEPHONE 499 
ployer's employment practices if there is an alleged underlying 
policy of discrimination.8 
The "across the board" approach epitomizes the liberality 
accorded to Title VII class suits because it allows an employee 
discriminated against in hiring to attack not only the employer's 
hiring practices but also its other employment practices, such as 
transfer and promotion.10 The Supreme Court has criticized this 
approach because "conflict might arise ... between employees 
and applicants who were denied employment and who will, if 
granted relief, compete with employees for fringe benefits or se-
niority."ll This presumed conflict of interest is considered fatal 
to broad class certification because a hiring class representative 
would not fairly and adequately pursue the claims of other em-
ployed class members as is required by Rule 23(a)(4).11 But de-
spite such criticism from the Supreme Court, the "across the 
board approach" has been applied and adopted by the lower 
courts. is For example, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals re-
cently adopted the "across the board approach" in Jordan v. 
County of Los Angeles.14 
Falcon came to the Supreme Court out of the Fifth Circuit, 
which, at the time Title VII was passed, included the states of 
Alabama, Georgia, Florida, Louisiana, and Mississippi.111 These 
southern states are notorious for their history of discrimina-
tion,lS and therefore it is probably no coincidence that the Fifth 
9. See notes 19 to 23 and accompanying text infra. 
10. See note 22 infra. 
11. 102 S. Ct. 2364, 2371 n.13 (1982). 
12. See also East Texas Motor Freight v. Rodriguez, 431 U.S. 395 (1977); notes 24 to 
31 and accompanying text infra. See also Franks v. Bowman, 424 U.S. 747 (1975) which 
allows applicants denied employment due to unlawful discrimination to receive retroac-
tive seniority. This, therefore, raises a potential conflict of interest between the appli-
cants and the employees. 
13. See note 22 infra. 
14. 669 F.2d 1311, 1318-19, and n.l0 (9th Cir.), vacated and remanded. 51 U.S.L.W. 
3252 (1982). See also Gay v. Waiters' & Dairy Lunchmen's Union, 549 F.2d 1330 (9th 
Cir. 1977). 
15. Former 28 U.S.C. § 41, amended Oct. 14, 1980, P.L. 96-452, § 2, 94 Stat. 1994 
(Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals Reorganization Act of 1980) (reduced the Fifth Circuit to 
the District of the Canal Zone, Louisiana, Mississippi, and Texas). 
16. The frenetic pace and extent of change in race relations in the 
past twenty years has dimmed the memory of what it was to 
be a Negro citizen in the South in 1954. All public schools 
were segregated [by law]; public accomodations were segre-
5
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Circuit was the first appellate court to review the application of 
Rule 23 to Title VII in Oatis v. Crown-Zellerbach. 17 
In Oatis, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals reasoned that 
because racial discrimination was by definition class discrimina-
tion, a broad application of Rule 23 to Title VII was thereby 
warranted.18 Later, the Fifth Circuit relied on Oatis in Johnson 
v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc. 18 and concluded that Rule 23 
would permit "an 'across the board' attack on unequal employ-
ment practices alleged to have been committed by the [em-
ployer] pursuant to its policy of racial discrimination."20 In an 
oft quoted passage the Johnson court stated that "[w]hile it is 
true. . . that there are different factual questions with regard to 
different employees, it is also true that the 'Damoclean threat of 
a racially discriminatory policy hangs over the racial class [and] 
is a question of fact common to all members of the class.' "21 
Any alleged discriminatory policy was therefore perceived as 
providing common questions of law and fact, and the typical 
claims or defenses which satisfied the requirements of Rule 23. 
Johnson, and the across the board approach, have continually 
been cited with approval both inllll and out28 of the Fifth Circuit, 
gated; only a minute percentage of registered voters was black; 
and black public office holders were virtually non·existent. 
Black families had less than one· half the median incomes of 
white families, and illiteracy rates were appallingly high. The 
black American in the South was a second class citizen, an ex· 
ile in his own country. 
F. READ & L. MCGOUGH, LET THEM BE JUDGED xi (1978). See also 1964 U.S. CODE CONGo 
& AD. NEWS 2355, 2513·17. 
17. 398 F.2d 496 (5th Cir. 1968). 
18. rd. at 499. 
19. 417 F.2d 1122 (5th Cir. 1969). 
20. {d. at 1124. 
21. rd. 
22. Payne v. Travenol Laboratories, Inc., 565 F.2d 895 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 
U.S. 835 (1978); Long v. Sapp, 502 F.2d 34 (5th Cir. 1974) (Reaffirmed Johnson and 
allowed a terminated employee to challenge racially discriminatory policies throughout 
the employer's business.) In Carr v. Conoeo Plastics Inc., 423 F.2d 57 (5th Cir.), cert. 
denied, 400 U.S. 951 (1970), the court allowed rejected applicants to attack both the 
employer's plant practices as well as hiring practices. The court stated that the "plain. 
tiffs here seek equal opportunity for employment, and charge defendants with discrimi· 
nating against them on account of race. There can be no serious question but that plain· 
tiffs have the right to bring the action for themselves and others similarly situated. 
Envisioning an equal opportunity for employment {the rejected applicants] have the 
correlated right to enjoy nondiscriminatory practices within the plant." rd. at 65. (em· 
phasis added). See also Doe V. First City Bancorp., Inc., 81 F.R.D. 562 (S.D. Tex. 1978). 
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but the validity of the across the board approach was ostensibly 
questioned, prior to thp-se cases, by the Supreme Court in East 
Texas Motor Freight v Rodriguez. l • 
In Rodriguez, three city truck drivers, allegedly wrongfully 
denied transfers to more desirable routes, sought to represent all 
Blacks and Mexican-Americans aggrieved by the employer's va-
rious employment practices. The district court found that the 
employer's transfer policies were neutral, and dismissed the in-
dividual claims. Moreover, it dismissed the class claim because 
the plaintiffs had never motioned the court for a class certifica-
tion hearing and, to the court, this indicated that the plaintiffs 
would not be adequate class representatives under Rule 
23(a)(4).SII The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed 
on this latter finding by reasoning that the trial court itself "has 
an independent obligation to decide whether an action brought 
on a class basis is to be maintained even if neither of the parties 
moves for a ruling under [Rule 23] subsection (c)(I)."18 Stating 
that Rule 23 should be liberally applied to Title VII suits, the 
Fifth Circuit court then certified a class of Black and Mexican-
American city driver employees covered by certain collective 
bargaining agreements. I' 
The Supreme Court unanimously reversed.18 The Court 
stated that the standards of Rule 23 required that "a class rep-
resentative ... be part of the class and 'possess the same inter-
See generally, How Far the Across the Board: The Permissible Breadth 01 Title VII 
Class Actions, 24 ARIZ. L. REV. 61 (1982) (Pre-Falcon). 
23. Jordan v. County of Washington, 669 F.2d 1311, 1318-19 (9th Cir.), vacated and 
remanded, 51 U.S.L.W. 3252 (1982); Barnett v. W.T. Grant, 518 F.2d 543 (4th Cir. 1975). 
24. 431 U.S. 395 (1977). 
25. Id. at 404-05. The district court "stressed the plaintiffs' failure to move for a 
prompt determination of the propriety of class certification, their failure to offer evi-
dence on that question, their concentration at the trial on their individual claims, their 
stipulation that the only i88ue to be determined concerned the company's failure to act 
on their applications" and a conflict between the relief the plaintiffs sought and a senior-
ity system recently approved by the membership of their union. Id. at 400. For the text 
of Rule 23(a)(4), see note 3, supra. 
26. 505 F.2d 40, 50 (5th Cir. 1974) (quoting 7A C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL 
PRACTICE & PROCEDURE, § 1785 (1972).) Rule 23 subsection (c)(l) provides that "[a]s 
Boon 88 practicable after the commencment of an action brought 88 a class action, the 
court shall determine by order whether it is to be so maintained." 
27. Id. citing 7 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 26, § 1771 (1972); Bing V. Road-
way Express Inc., 485 F.2d 441, 446 (5th Cir. 1973). 
28. 431 U.S. 395 (1977). 
7
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est and suffer the same injury' as the class members."iB Apply-
ing this test to the facts of the case as found by the trial court, 
the Supreme Court reversed because the named plaintiffs were 
not qualified for the line driver positions and Utherefore could 
have suffered no injury as a result of the allegedly discrimina-
tory practices. "80 The Court ruled that the plaintiffs u were, 
therefore, simply not eligible to represent a class of persons who 
did allegedly suffer injury."8} The court added: 
We are not unaware that suits alleging racial or 
ethnic discrimination are often by their very na-
ture class suits, involving classwide wrongs. Com-
mon questions of law or fact are typically present. 
But careful attention to the requirements of 
[Rule 23] remains nonetheless indispensable. The 
mere fact that a complaint alleges racial or ethnic 
discrimination does not in itself ensure that the 
party who has brought the lawsuit will be an ade-
quate representative of those who may have been 
the real victims of that discrimination. at 
IV. General Telephone Company 0/ the Southwest v. Falcon 
In Falcon, an employee who was allegedly unlawfully denied 
a promotion brought a Title VII suit and sought to have it main-
tained as a class action. The plaintiff alleged the facts set forth 
in the introduction of this note, and the district court certified a 
class comprised of Mexican-American employees and Mexican-
American applicants not hired by the defendant. The district 
court certified the class without holding an evidentiary hearing 
on the class issues, and merely supported its order Uby the rul-
29. [d. at 403-04. This same interest and same injury test was first applied in 
Schlesinger v. Reservist Committee to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 216 (1973). 
30. 431 U.S. at 403-04. 
31. [d. at 406. Note that the appellate court discounted entirely the district court's 
finding of a conflict between the plaintiffs and the other class members because the ap-
pellate court concluded that the district court could have narrowed the class or broken it 
up into subclasses, (see Oatis v. Crown Zellerbach Corp., 398 F.2d 496, 499 (5th Cir. 
1968» or it could have shaped the relief to avoid injustice. Citing Franks v. Bowman 
Transportation Co., 495 F.2d 398, 414 (5th Cir. 1974). 
32. [d. at 405-06. See generally Developments in the Law-Employment Discrimi-
nation and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 84 H-,!RV. L. REV. 1109 (1971). "The 
Fifth Circuit's 'across the board' class action concept goes a long way toward effectuating 
the public interest. But it nonetheless should not be applied before a careful examination 
is made to be certain that the plaintiff really does fairly and adequately represent the 
interests of the class for which he purports to act." [d. at 1220. 
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ing of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit 
in Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., that any victim of 
racial discrimination in employment may maintain an across the 
board attack on all unequal employment practices alleged to 
have been committed by the employer pursuant to a policy of 
racial discrimination. "88 
After granting the class certification motion, the district 
court, in the liability phase of the trial, entered separate orders 
with respect to the plaintiff and the class. The court found that 
the defendant had discriminated against the plaintiff in promo-
tion but not in hiring, and that it had discriminated against the 
class in hiring but not in promotion.84 The result reached was an 
ironic dichotomy because the representative plaintiff's interest 
was inversely related to the interests of the class. An employee 
discriminated against in promotions but not in hiring was repre-
senting a class discriminated against in hiring but not 
promotion.81 
On appeal to the Fifth Circuit, the defendant asserted two 
principle arguments: first, "that the failure to hold an eviden-
tiary hearing on the issue of certification" required reversal of 
the class certification; and second, that the Supreme Court rul-
ing in East Texas Motor Freight v. Rodriguez foreclosed the 
possibility of an employee representing applicants in a class 
suit.86 The appellate court rejected the first argument by stating 
that "[i]f later evidence shows the decision to certify the class to 
have been a correct one, there is obviously no need to have held 
such a hearing."S? In other words, the court was stating that if 
33. 102 S. Ct. 2364, 2368 (1982). 
34. [d. at 2368. The reason the class certification hearing is separated from the lia-
bility issue is that: "[N)othing in either the language or history of Rule 23 ... gives a 
court any authority to conduct a preliminary inquiry into the merits of a suit in order to 
determine whether it may be maintained as a class action. Indeed, such a procedure 
contravenes the rule .... [It) is directly contrary to the command of subdivision (c)(l) 
.... " Eisen v. Corlise & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 177-78 (1974). 
35. 102 S. Ct. 2364, 2368 (1982). As to this resulting form of class representation, the 
Court stated "the individual and class claims might as well as have been tried sepa-
rately," and added, "It is clear that the maintenance of respondent's action as a class 
action did not advance the 'efficiency and economy of litigation which is the principal 
purpose of the procedure,' " citing American Pipe & Construction Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 
438, 553 (1974). See also note 8, supra. 
36. 626 F.2d 369, 373-74 (5th Cir. 1980). 
37. Id. at 374, citing King v. Gulf Oil Co., 581 F.2d 1184, 1186-87 (5th Cir. 1968). 
9
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the decision to certify a class was correct, then the absence of an 
evidentiary hearing was non prejudicial and irrelevant in terms 
of appellate review. 
The employer's second argument at the appellate level was 
that Rodriguez foreclosed the possibility of an employee repre-
senting a class of both applicants and employees because the 
promotion claim would necessarily lack a factual nexus with any 
of the hiring claims, and therefore such a class would fail to sat-
isfy the commonality and typicality requirements of Rule 23. sa 
The employer argued that the certification of such a class would 
violate the standard of Rodriguez because a plaintiff who had 
been hired by the employer would lack the same interests and 
same injuries as the applicants who had never been hired, and 
therefore the plaintiff could not be a proper representative of 
such a class. 811 
In response to this argument, the Falcon plaintiff argued 
that the Fifth Circuit had not interpreted the nexus requirement 
of Rodriguez restrictively4° and cited Payne v. Travenol41 in 
38. See note 3, supra. See also Satterwhite v. City of Greenville, 578 F.2d 987, 993-
94 (5th Cir. 1978), vacated and remanded, 445 U.S. 940 (1980). Cf. Jordan v. County of 
Los Angeles, 669 F.2d 1311, 1318-19 (9th Cir.), vacated and remanded, 51 U.S.L.W. 3252 
(1982) which stated: 
Variations regarding qualifications and prior work records are 
typically present in Title VII employment discrimination 
cases. Where the common thread of discrimination is alleged 
to weave through the defendant's employment practices, the 
varying ways in which the alleged discriminatory policy affects 
different class members, if at all, should not preclude class 
certification .... As both the claims of the named represen-
tative and the claims of the class stem from the same practice 
of the defendant and are based upon the same legal theory, 
the required nexus is present. The existence of this nexus is 
further demonstrated by the fact that the requested injunctive 
relief will, if granted, inure to the benefit of the class and class 
representative as a member thereof. 
Id. at 1321-22 (citations omitted). 
39. See, e.g., Scott v. University of Delaware, 601 F.2d 76, 87·88 (3d Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 444 U.S. 931 (1979)i Hill v. Western Electric Co., Inc., 596 F.2d 99 (4th Cir.), cert. 
denied, 444 U.S. 929 (1979). The validity of this argument may in fact be quite specious. 
See, for example, Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins., Co., 409 U.S. 205 (1972)i Waters 
v. Hublein Inc., 547 F.2d 466 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 433 U.S. 915 (1977)i Richard-
son v. Restaurant Marketing Assoc., 527 F. Supp. 690 (N.D. Cal. 1981)i Work Environ-
ment Injury Under Title V//, 82 YALE L.J. 1695 (1973). 
40. 626 F.2d at 375i see also cases cited therein, and Vuyanich v. Republic National 
Bank, 82 F.R.D. 420 (N.D. Tex. 1979) ("Indeed, the purposes of Title VII counsel in 
10
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support of its assertion that the across the board approach was 
still permissible in the Fifth Circuit notwithstanding the Su-
preme Court's decision in Rodriguez ... a 
In Payne, Black women brought an action against the de-
fendant employer and attacked the employer's educational re-
quirements for a certain job classification because the require-
ments allegedly had a disparate racial impact and lacked any 
significant business necessity. The trial court sustained this ar-
gument and allowed the case to proceed as a class action. The 
employer appealed, and at the appellate level argued that the 
plaintiffs should not be allowed to represent a class which in-
cluded those positions because the advanced education require-
ments only applied to one particular type of job for which the 
class representatives were not qualified. This was rejected by the 
appellate court: 
Plaintiff's action is an "across the board" attack 
on unequal employment practices alleged to have 
been committed by Travenol pursuant to a policy 
of racial discrimination. As parties who have al-
legedly been aggrieved by some of these discrimi-
natory practices, plaintiffs have demonstrated a 
sufficient nexus to enable them to represent other 
class members suffering from different practices 
motivated by the same policies." 
The appellate court in Falcon agreed with the Payne hold-
ing and concluded that a class of both applicants and employees 
would not be overly broad and could be represented by the 
plaintiff. The appellate court in Falcon held that both plaintiff 
and the class complained of a common injury based on discrimi-
nation because of their national origin, and that this commonal-
ity outweighed any dissimilarities which might arise by different 
specific discriminatory practices (i.e. hiring and promotion) ..... 
favor of across the board representation. Recent Fifth Circuit cases have endorsed such 
suits.") See also Jordan v. County of Los Angeles, 669 F.2d 1311, 1318-19 (9th Cir.), 
vacated and remanded, 51 U.S.L.W. 3252 (1982). 
41. 565 F.2d 895 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 835 (1978). 
42. 626 F.2d at 375. Payne v. Travenol, supra note 41. See also Satterwhite v. City 
of Greenville, 578 F.2d 987, 993-94 n.8 (5th Cir. 1978), vacated and remanded, 100 S. Ct. 
1334 (1980); Ct. Local 194, Retail & Wholesale & Dept. Store Union V. Standard Brands 
Inc. 85 F.R.D. 599 (N.D. III. 1979). 
43. 565 F.2d 895, 900 (5th Cir. 1978) (citation omitted). 
44. 626 F.2d at 375. 
11
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The appellate court added that in addition to this "alliance" the 
plaintiff had "showed a similarity of interest based on job loca-
tion, job function and other considerations. ".11 The appellate 
court concluded from this that "a sufficient nexus between the 
plaintiff's claims and those of the class" were therefore present 
and consequently the requirements of Rule 23 were satisfied.48 
From this ruling, the Supreme Court "granted certiorari to de-
cide whether the class action was properly maintained on behalf 
of both employees who were denied promotion and applicants 
who were denied employment."·? 
The Supreme Court reversed and remanded, with one dis-
sent which would have remanded the case for the class allega-
tions to be dismissed. The Supreme Court held that the district 
court erred in permitting the plaintiff to maintain a class action 
on behalf of both employees and applicants. The Court found 
that without gathering evidence on the class issues it was error 
to presume that the individual's claim and the class claims 
shared common questions of law or fact and that the individ-
ual's claim would be typical of the class. "Conceptually," the 
Court stated, "there is a wide gap between (a) an individual's 
claim that he has been denied a promotion on discriminatory 
grounds, and his otherwise unsupported allegation that the com-
pany has a policy of discrimination, and (b) the existence of a 
class of persons who have suffered the same injury as that indi-
vidual" such that the prerequisites of Rule 23(a) will be met.48 
The Court further noted that even though the "proposition un-
derlying the across-the-board rule-that racial discrimination is 
by definition class discrimination"-was a correct one, it con-
cluded that this finding "neither determines whether a class ac-
tion may be maintained in accordance with Rule 23 nor defines 
the class that may be certified. ".9 The Court reasoned: 
[E]ven though the evidence that [the plaintiff] 
was passed over for promotion when several less 
deserving whites were advanced may support the 
conclusion that [Falcon] was denied the promo-
tion because of his national origin, such evidence 
45. [d. at 375-76. 
46. [d. at 376. 
47. 102 S. Ct. 2364, 2369 (1982). 
48. [d. at 2371. 
49. [d. at 2370-71 (footnote omitted). 
12
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would not necessarily justify the additional infer-
ences (1) that this discriminatory treatment is 
typical of [the employer's] promotion practices, 
(2) that [the employer's] promotion practices are 
motivated by a policy of ethnic discrimination 
that pervades [thl:1 employer's work place], or (3) 
that this policy of ethnic discrimination is· re-
ft.ected in the [employer's] other employment 
practices, such as hiring, in the same way it is 
manifested in the promotion practices. eo 
507 
The Court noted that the district court erred by presuming 
that the plaintiff had satisfied the requirements of Rule 23 with-
out carefully evaluating the "legitimacy of [Falcon's] plea that 
he is a proper class representative under Rule 23(a)."lIl The 
Court stressed that a careful scrutiny of the facts was necessary 
because a judgment by the court will become res judicata to the 
class, and therefore significant unfairness would result "if the 
framing of the class is overbroad."11 The Court concluded that a 
class may only be certified, "after a rigorous analysis, that the 
prerequisites of Rule 23(a) have been satisfied."11 
V. CRITIQUE AND ANALYSIS 
The holding in Falcon is quite simple- "that a Title VII 
class action, like any other class action, may only be certified if 
the trial court is satisfied after a rigorous analysis, that the pre-
requisites of Rule 23(a) have been satisfied."" This simple hold-
ing instructs courts in fairly clear language to approach Title VII 
class suits without any presumption of liberality.1I11 The lower 
courts, however, are in conflict as to the broader significance un-
derlying the Court's decision. For example, at least one court has 
held that the across the board approach has received an impri-
matur of approval through Falcon;lIe other courts have inter-
preted Falcon as merely requiring them to conduct an eviden-
SO. rd. at 2371. With regard to the court's conclusion that a plaintiff discriminated 
against in promotion but not ·in hiring could represent a class discriminated against in 
hiring but not in promotion, see note 35 and accompanying text, supra. 
51. 102 S.Ct. at 2372. 
52. rd. 
53. rd. at 2373. 
54. rd. 
55. For the differing interpretations of this decision, see notes 60 and 61 and accom-
panying text infra. 
56. Meyer v. MacMillan Pub. Co., Inc., 95 F.R.D. 411 (S.D.N.Y. 1982). 
13
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tiary hearing on the class issues;1I7 still other courts have 
concluded that the across the board approach can no longer be 
condoned under the standard set forth in Falcon. 1I8 
The two extreme interpretations of Falcon can be traced to 
two conflicting passages in the Court's opinion. On the one hand, 
the Court cited one of its previous decisions and stated that 
"[i]n employment discrimination litigation, conflicts might arise, 
for example, between employees and applicants who were denied 
employment and who will, if granted relief, compete with em-
ployees for fringe benefits or seniority. Under Rule 23, the same 
plaintiff could not represent these classes."119 However, in almost 
the same breath, the Court continued:"Significant proof that an 
employer operated under a general policy of discrimination con-
ceivably could justify a class of both applicants and employees if 
the discrimination manifested itself in hiring and promotion 
practices in the same general fashion, such as through entirely 
subjective decision-making processes."80 
In Meyer v. MacMillan Publishing CO.,SI a district court 
certified a class of both applicants and employees, and stated, in 
a cavalier opinion, that "[w]hile we do not yet have the benefit 
of further elaboration concerning the meaning of 'significant 
proof [of] ... a general policy of discrimination,' we think that 
the affidavits submitted by plaintiffs meet that standard."s2 
Note that both in Rodriguez and in Falcon the Supreme Court 
had condemned the practice of certifying a class by merely rely-
ing on the pleadings.ss Yet the Meyer court, in a sense, did just 
this by finding the requisite "significant proor' in the plaintiffs 
affidavits. Moreover, the Meyer court relied heavily on Falcon to 
support its opinion that this was all still permissible.8• 
57. Wheeler v. City of Columbus, Mississippi, 686 F.2d 1144 (5th Cir. 1982); Ander· 
son v. City of Albuquerque, 690 F.2d 796 (10th Cir. 1982); McKenzie v. Sawyer, 684 F.2d 
62 (D.C. Cir. 1982); Meyer v. MacMillan, note 55, supra. 
58. De Medina v. Reinhardt, 686 F.2d 997 (D.C. Cir. 1982); Nation v. Winn-Dixie 
Stores, Inc., 95 F.R.D. 82, 85 (N.D. Ga. 1982); Hawkins v. Fulton County, 95 F.R.D. 88, 
92 (N.D. Ga. 1982). 
59. 102 S. Ct. at 2371 n.13. Ct. Carr v. Conoeo Plastics, supra note 22. 
60. [d. at n.15. 
61. 95 F.R.D. 411, 415 (S.D.N.Y. 1982). 
62. [d. at 415. 
63. 102 S. Ct. at 2370-72. 
64. 95 F.R.D. at 415-16. This case also allowed an exempt employee to represent 
nonexempt employees, altho~gh this has been held to be impermissible in other cases, 
14
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The Meyer interpretation of the Falcon holding, albeit a 
minority interpretation at this time, is probably correct. If the 
Supreme Court was intent on sounding a death knell for the 
across the board approach, then it could have taken stronger ac-
tion when the issue was before it. It could have dismissed the 
class allegations of the plaintiff's complaint altogether, instead 
of merely remanding the class issues for further consideration," 
and could have deleted the dicta which has been seized upon by 
the Meyer court. This procedural aspect of Falcon, taken to-
gether with the dicta relied on by Meyer, leaves the practitioner 
and the courts with a solid argument that the across the board 
approach has not been affected by the Supreme Court's decision. 
While at the time of this writing it is too early to forcefully come 
to this conclusion, this aspect of the case does provide a viable 
argument against an overly restrictive reading of Falcon. 
VI. A SUGGESTION 
The trial court in Falcon and the appellate court in Rodri-
guez were attempting to fashion broad relief in response to the 
broader impact of race discrimination, which is, by definition, 
class discrimination.ee Given the South's history, it is hard to 
fault such judicial activism87 and liberal application of Rule 23 
Bee, e.g., Nation v. Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc., 95 F.R.D. 82, 86 (N.D. Ga. 1982); Ladele v. 
Conrail, 95 F.R.D. 198 (E.D. Penn. 1982); Piva v. Xerox, 70 F.R.D. 378 (N.D. Cal. 1975). 
65. Chief Justice Burger concurred in part and dissented in part. He concurred in 
the general principles of the Court's discussion on the requirements of Rule 23, but with 
regard to the decision to remand the caae for further consideration, he noted that Fal-
con's complaint of discrimination in promotion was an individualized plea not suscepti-
ble to class treatment. Noting that the principle behind class suits was economy and 
efficiency of litigation, which would not, in his opinion, be advanced in the case before 
the court, he would have remanded with instructions to dismiss the class claim. 102 S. 
Ct. at 2373. 
66. See notes 6 and 16, supra. 
67. See notes 7 and 16, supra. See also Horn v. Associated Wholesale Grocers, Inc., 
555 F.2d 270 (lOth Cir. 1977) discussing the numerosity requirement of Rule 23: 
Why.was it important to give such stress to the requirement of 
large number? Considering that the presence of the parties in 
the class was unilnportant to the granting of injunctive relief, 
this emphasis appears misplaced. We conclude that it did not 
justify rejection of the class. There can be judicial notice that 
employees are apprehensive concerning 1088 of jobs and the 
welfare of their families. They are frequently unwilling to pio-
neer an undertaking of this kind since they are unsure as to 
whether the court will support them. Even if they do prevail, 
they are apprehensive about offending the employer as a re-
sult of taking a stand. 
15
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to Title VII.88 However, one would be equally hard pressed to 
find employers, and their amici curiae,89 who share this enthusi-
asm. Despite any assumed altruism on the part of the lower 
courts, the fact remains that the Supreme Court has used both 
Rodriguez70 and Falcon71 as opportunities to strongly criticize, 
albeit by dicta, the across the board approach. 
Justice Godbold, in his specially concurring opInIOn to 
Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, presented this caveat 
with regard to the potential unfairness to class members bound 
by res judicata to an adverse ruling against an overbroad class: 
"[T]he error of the 'tacit assumption' underlying the across-the-
board rule [is] that all will be well for surely the plaintiff will 
win and manna will fall on all the members of the class."72 
The holding in Falcon is intended to vitiate this potential 
unfairness in the "tacit assumption" by requiring a rigorous 
analysis of the case in order to ensure strict compliance with 
Rule 23. If the courts are now required to hold an evidentiary 
hearing and rigorously analyze compliance with Rule 23, why 
should the courts not also be required to support their orders 
granting the certification of a class with written findings of fact 
and conclusions of law? While there is not much opinion on this, 
it has been stated that: 
[d. at 275. 
Although the district court is not required to 
make findings in deciding a motion of the type 
here involved [Rule 23], we do think that where, 
68. See notes 16, 22, and 60 and accompanying text, supra. 
69. Note that only thirteen class members were found to exist in Falcon. Classes 
with greater numerosity have been denied. See, e.g., Crawford v. Western Elec. Co., Inc., 
614 F.2d 1300 (5th Cir. 1980) (34 class members not sufficiently numerous); Garcia v. 
Gloor, 618 F.2d 264 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1113 (31 class members not 
sufficiently numerous). What was it that compelled the defendant, and amici, not to also 
argue the numerosity issue when classes with far more numbers have been denied certifi· 
cation solely on the basis of numerosity? This aspect of the case suggests that the defen-
dant took the case up to the Supreme Court specifically seeking a restrictive ruling on 
the commonality and typicality requirements of Rule 23. 
70. Accord Shelton v. Parga, Inc., 582 F.2d 1298 (4th Cir. 1978); Local 194, Retail & 
Wholesale & Department Store Union v. Standard Brands, 85 F.R.D. 599 (N.D. Ill. 
1979). 
71. See note 57, supra. Ct. notes 56 and 60 and accompanying text, supra. For an 
intermediate reading of Falcon, see Ladele v. Conrail, 95 F.R.D. 198 (E.D. Penn. 1982). 
72. 102 S. Ct. 2364,2372, citing Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 417 F.2d 
1122, 1127 (5th Cir. 1969). 
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as here, the district court is presented with con-
flicting positions of substance as to how,it should 
exercise its discretion in determining whether to 
permit a class action, it is salutary practice to give 
the litigants, either orally or in writing, at least 
minimum articulation of the reasons for its 
decision. '78 
511 
It would be preferable, however, to take this salutory prac-
tice one step further and require a writing.'· Given that one of 
the prime justifications for allowing the class action device, in 
the first instance, is its inherent economy and efficiency of litiga-
tion,70 then the minimal effort taken to make written findings of 
fact and conclusions of law should not significantly effect that 
economy. Moreover, not only would the courts assure themselves 
of going a long way towards fulfilling the Falcon requirements, 
but also the courts might better shore up their decisions from 
appellate attack, and ultimate Supreme Court review. For exam-
ple, had the Falcon district court determined at an earlier date 
that the certification of a class would result in an ironic inverse 
representation,'8 then it could have ordered notice for interven-
tion to go out to a more qualified representative of the class." 
73. Interpace Corp. v. City of Philadelphia. 438 F.2d 401. 404 (3d Cir. 1971). See 
also MANUAL POR COMPLEX LITIGATION, § 1.40, n.29 (4th ed. 1977). 
74. Mr. Sam Kagel, Esq., a mediator/arbitrator, explains why he will unfailingly 
provide a written opinion with his arbitration awards by way of example. Mr. Kagel was 
once asked by a prominent owner of a national football team exactly what he did in 
order to write an arbitration award. Mr. Kagel responded that he always writes his opin-
ions with the losing party in mind because it will be that party who not only has an 
interest, but also has a right. in knowing just why he lost. Drawing an analogy to football, 
Mr. Kagel said that after a football game is over, it is the winning party who celebrates, 
while the losing party stays in the clubhouse reviewing the video tapes. Similarly, if an 
employer has a class certified against him, it is only fair that he should know why he lost 
with particularity. Moreover, this ruling might put the employer on' notice so that it 
might sooner correct its discriminatory employment practices. Interview with Sam Kagel 
Esq., mediator/arbitrator, in San Francisco, California (January 31, 1983). 
75. See note 8, supra. 
76. See note 35 and accompanying text, supra. 
77. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(d) provides, in part: 
In the conduct of actions to which this rule applies, the court 
may make appropriate orders: ... (2) requiring, for the pro-
tection of the members of the class or otherwise for the fair 
conduct of the action, that notice be given in such a manner as 
the court may direct to some or all of the members of any step 
of the action or of the proposed extent of the judgment, or of 
the opportunity of members to signify whether they consider 
the representation fair and adequate, to intervene and present 
claims or defenses, or otherwise come into the action. 
17
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VII. CONCLUSION 
The holding in Falcon requires the federal courts to hold an 
evidentiary hearing on the class representative's Rule 23 qualifi-
cations. At least one reported case has held, in no uncertain 
terms, that Falcon nevertheless expressly permits an across the 
board approach to Title VII suits.78 Other courts have come to 
an opposite, although questionable, conclusion.T' The fact is, 
however, that it is possible to glean dicta from the opinion which 
will support either conclusion.eo 
A preferable alternative would be to require the courts to 
issue written findings of fact and conclusions of law with any 
order certifying a class. If a court's review of the facts, and its 
sense of justice, compels it to accept an across the board attack 
on the defendant's employment practices, then a careful scru-
tiny of the facts, or enlistment of the powers available to it,.1 
should result in an order meeting the Falcon and Rodriguez 
standards. In this fashion, a court might both advance its sense 
of justice and remain within the parameters of Falcon. 
See also note 31, supra. 
78. See note 61 and accompanying text, supra. 
79. See note 58, supra. 
SO. See notes 59 and 60, supra. 
81. See note 77. supra. 
• Third year student. G9lden Gate University School of Law. 
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